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Abstract: Reciprocity has been shown to be sensitive to perceived intentions, 
however, not much is known about the intensity of reciprocal responses to the precise 
nature of those intentions. For example, a person can strategically appear to be kind 
while being self-serving or can be selflessly (genuinely) kind. Do these two intentions 
elicit different reciprocal reactions? We propose a conjecture that self-serving but 
generous actions diminish the positively reciprocal response, compared to selfless 
generous actions. We classify actions that increase a recipient’s maximum payoff, but 
by less than the giver’s maximum payoff, as being self-serving generous actions, 
while classifying actions that increase a recipient’s maximum payoff by more than the 
giver’s as selfless generous actions. We hypothesize that selfless generous actions are 
considered more generous than self-serving generous actions, and that self-serving 
generous actions will therefore result in a diminished reciprocal response. We test this 
conjecture using two novel experimental designs. We find some evidence that 
subjects perceive self-serving generous actions as being less generous than selfless 
generous actions, but no empirical support for our conjecture on the diminished 
reciprocal response. 
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“If you’re helping someone and expecting something in return, you’re doing business 
not kindness.”  
Unknown. 
1. Introduction 
Do you care whether a person is genuinely (selflessly) kind to you or whether he just 
pretends to be so he could reap future benefits? Does your response to his kind action 
depend on whether his behavior is potentially strategic (self-serving)? There are many 
everyday situations where the distinction between genuine or strategic intent plays a 
crucial role in determining the intensity of behavioral response. Consider the 
following scenario. You are at a restaurant in a country with a tipping culture and the 
waiter is providing an extraordinary service. You realize that his kindness might be 
disingenuous and that he might be pretending to be nice in order to extract a higher 
tip. How do you tip him? Do you care about the possible intentions behind his action, 
which while being beneficial to you, was potentially more beneficial to him? Do you 
then elect to not reward him with a higher tip or do you tip well, in excess of what you 
normally tip, because you had a pleasant dining experience thanks to his service? 
Previous research provides vast evidence that many economic transactions are 
governed by reciprocity (see Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Camerer, 2003; Sobel, 2005; Fehr 
& Schmidt, 2006; Chaudhuri, 2008 for surveys). Kind and unkind intentions behind 
actions have been identified as an important driving factor of positively (Cox, 2004; 
Cox, Sadiraj & Sadiraj, 2008; Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher, 2008) and negatively 
reciprocal behavior (Blount, 1995; Offerman, 2002). However, not much is known 
about the intensity of reciprocal responses to the precise nature of those intentions, for 
example when the level of kindness (or conversely unkindness) increases from ‘kind’ 
to ‘kinder’. From this perspective, most previous studies could be described as having 
a ‘binary format’ in that they consider reciprocal responses to kind actions versus 
actions with neutral or no intentions, or pitch kind actions against unkind ones. Our 
research takes a step towards the ‘continuous format’ as we keep the underlying 
actions kind, but vary intentions in a way suggested by the above example with the 
waiter who is being strategically kind. 
As reciprocity is particularly sensitive to perceived intentions, distinguishing between 
genuine and strategic intentions is central for understanding of the origins of 
reciprocal behavior. In this paper we therefore formally develop a conjecture that a 
self-serving generous action (a specific type of strategic kind behavior) leads to a 
weaker positively reciprocal response than a selfless generous action. To pin down the 
terminology, in the spirit of the Revealed Altruism theory by Cox, Friedman & 
Sadiraj (2008) we define self-serving generosity as a giver’s (henceforth, First Mover 
or FM) action that directly benefits the recipient (henceforth, Second Mover or SM) 
by increasing her maximum payoff, while also benefiting the FM by increasing his 
own maximum payoff by more than that of the SM. Similarly, if the action results in a 
smaller increase (or a decrease) in the FM’s maximum payoff, we classify this as 
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selfless generosity. To investigate reciprocal preferences, we focus on how the SM 
reacts after a FM chooses either a self-serving or selfless action. Importantly, we keep 
the underlying FM’s action otherwise equally generous in both cases. This gives us a 
clean test of the strength of reciprocal responses to actions that are selfless and self-
serving. 
We experimentally test our conjecture in two novel designs that allow us to vary the 
precise nature of intentions (self-serving or selfless) in a way pinned down by the 
underlying theory to study the ‘primitive’ of reciprocity (i.e. the kinder you are to me, 
the more I am inclined to be kind back). We find some evidence that subjects perceive 
self-serving generous actions as being less generous than selfless generous actions, 
which would imply a different reciprocal response from the above basic (naïve) 
interpretation of reciprocity. Despite that, we find no support for our conjecture on the 
diminished reciprocal response. Our results suggest a parsimonious refinement of the 
Revealed Altruism theory, as well as providing some justification for other theories of 
reciprocity to ignore considerations for self-serving generosity. 
 
2. Relationship to the Literature 
Economics experiments demonstrate that if kind or unkind intentions can be attributed 
to actions, the reciprocal response tends to change compared to a situation where no 
intentions can be inferred from the same actions (e.g. Charness, 2004; Gneezy, Güth 
& Verboven 2000; Kritikos & Bolle, 2004). The experimental designs studying the 
role of intentions thus allow for their presence in one condition and remove them in 
the control condition by either implementing the choice of the decision-maker 
exogenously by the experimenter (e.g. Cox, 2004), using a randomizing device (e.g., 
Cox & Deck, 2005), or by forcing a particular choice through limiting the choice set 
to one alternative (e.g. McCabe, Rigdon & Smith, 2003). Such designs, however, do 
not permit conclusions regarding the intensity of reciprocal responses based on the 
different underlying types of intentions that imply varying levels of kindness. 
Bruni, Corazzini & Stanca (2009) go one step further than the earlier papers and vary 
the nature of intentions (rather than completely removing them), by either informing 
or not informing the FM who has an opportunity to act in a generous way that the SM 
can reciprocate. They find that the SMs respond to the possible strategic motivation 
behind FMs’ generosity and reward them more when extrinsic motives can be ruled 
out. In contrast to Bruni et al., our design varies the nature of intentions by changing 
how much the FM stands to gain relative to the SM, making the generosity selfless or 
self-serving, all while keeping both parties fully informed about the feasible final 
allocations. Such a distinction is not possible in the Bruni et al. design as the FM and 
SM’s maximum payoffs are kept constant in their informed and uninformed 
treatments, meaning they are not different by the ‘self-servingness’ of their FM’s 
generous actions.  
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Additionally, our design contrasts with Bruni et al., in that we vary the level of 
potential strategic motivation, rather than ruling it out entirely. A FM that makes 
increasingly self-serving (selfless) but generous actions is increasingly more (less) 
likely to be taking that action for strategic reasons.
2
 From this overall perspective, the 
novelty of our approach to studying reciprocal behavior comes from varying the 
nature of intentions by means of how much one person stands to gain relative to 
another without manipulating the informational content. The channel through which 
the nature of intentions is varied could be important for the reciprocal response.  By 
varying intentions in terms of observable outcomes, there is less uncertainty about the 
FM’s decision; the FM knowingly took an action fully understanding the 
consequences. Changing the informational content as in Bruni et al. is intuitive from a 
qualitative standpoint, but hard to pin down in terms of quantitative theory, which is 
an advantage of our approach. 
While there exists evidence that perceived intentions behind actions determine the 
reciprocal response, the actual intentions, are usually difficult to infer from actions. 
To this effect Cox, Servátka & Vadovič (2017) conduct an experiment testing whether 
acts of commission reveal intent to a greater degree and therefore lead to a stronger 
reciprocal response than acts of omission. They indeed find that acts of commission, 
which actively impose kindness or harm, generate stronger reciprocity than acts of 
omission, which represent failures to act kindly or to prevent harm. In their 
experiment a generous act increases the opportunity set of the SM, but is selfless; 
hence their data do not (and are not intended to) permit a conclusion as to whether the 
SM responds to the generous action being self-serving or not.  
What intuition do existing models of reciprocity provide regarding the importance of 
self-serving intentions for reciprocal behavior? Distributional preference theories (e.g. 
Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000) describe preferences over the final 
distributions of payoffs, with no considerations for how surplus is generated. 
Motivations behind actions, such as self-serving generosity, are not considered when 
decision-makers make their consequential choices; therefore such models do not shed 
any light on our research question.  
Belief-dependent models of reciprocity by Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger 
(2004), or Falk & Fischbacher (2006) incorporate intentions through the SM’s beliefs 
about the kindness of the FM. For illustration, consider Falk & Fischbacher’s (2006) 
model that defines a kindness term, which is then used to determine the extent of 
reciprocal response. The kindness term consists of an intention factor and an outcome 
factor. The intention factor represents how intentional a FM is being in making a 
decision, as it is based on the presence of other decisions and how reasonable they 
are. The outcome factor is the difference between the expected payoffs of the FM and 
                                                          
2
 As will become clearer in our design the strategic element stems from the fact that the FMs can 
receive more back than their outside option. This is possible in all our treatments; in our self-serving 
treatments, more people will be taking the action for strategic reasons as it is more feasible that they 
will receive back more. 
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SM. This outcome factor is calculated given the SM’s beliefs about the other’s actions 
(a first-order belief), and their beliefs about the FM’s beliefs about the SM’s own 
actions (a second-order belief). If the kindness factor is positive, the action is 
considered kind, and if the kindness factor is negative, the action is considered 
unkind. SMs will want to reward kind actions and punish unkind actions, depending 
on how reciprocal they are. Actions that meet our definition of self-serving generosity 
could be considered unkind, as the outcome term is negative if we assume that a SM 
believes the FM expects to receive more than the SM. Falk & Fischbacher’s model 
can therefore predict that SMs will respond positively to selfless generous actions and 
negatively (or less positively) to self-serving generous actions, meaning we should 
observe a difference in the reciprocal response of the two types of generous actions, 
assuming fixed beliefs. Nonetheless, whether an action is considered self-serving or 
not depends entirely on the SM’s beliefs. While in principle it is possible to influence 
beliefs in experiments (e.g. through framing), in the given scenario they remain 
outside of our control. Another issue is that the above discussed equilibrium models 
are complex and have multiple equilibria in higher order beliefs (i.e. beliefs about 
other’s beliefs), making them intractable in many applications (see Cox, Friedman, 
and Gjerstad, 2007 for a more detailed discussion). Akin to the reason expressed 
nicely in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), sec. 5.1, pp. 1591-92, our goal is to test 
the implication that self-serving actions have for reciprocal reciprocity, not whether 
we observe equilibrium play in a one-shot setting and whether subjects form correct 
beliefs in the presence of self-serving and selfless actions. All of the above makes 
testing our conjecture troublesome in a belief-dependent framework.
3
  
Charness & Rabin (2002) incorporate intentions by having the SM lose other-
regarding considerations towards the FM if the FM ‘misbehaves’ by acting 
inconsistently with some 'social consensus’. However, Charness & Rabin assume 
SMs have quasi-maximin preferences, according to which people care about social 
welfare, so it is not clear how the SM would react to a self-serving generous action 
that always improves social welfare compared to a selfless generous action that would 
increase social welfare by less, or in some instances decrease social welfare. SMs may 
then lose other-regarding preferences for those that undertook a selfless generous 
action, which is the opposite of our conjecture. Furthermore, different assumptions 
about social consensus would have different implications for the SM’s response, 
therefore an a priori criterion for specifying the social consensus with respect to self-
serving generosity would be necessary to make a testable prediction. 
                                                          
3
 Other shortcomings and limitations of belief-dependent models of reciprocity are discussed in Hinz & 
Nicklisch (2015) who explore the continuity of the reference value (employed by Rabin, 1993 and 
Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004) and the continuity of the intention factor (Falk & Fischbacher, 
2006) in a series of mini-ultimatum games. They find that the distance of the observed offers to the 
proposed reference value provides a poor measure for their kindness and that a pairwise comparison of 
offers à la Falk & Fischbacher’s model cannot explain behavior in richer settings. 
 
6 
 
An appropriate theory of reciprocity to embed our explorations in would either have, 
or allow for introducing, considerations for self-serving motivations, and provide us 
with clear and testable hypotheses on observables. Such a theory, not dependent on 
beliefs, is that of Revealed Altruism (Cox, Friedman & Sadiraj, 2008, henceforth 
CFS). In this theory CFS posit that an action that is more generous than another is met 
with a more (conditionally) altruistic response. CFS define an action from a FM being 
‘more generous than’ (MGT) another to the SM if it meets two conditions. The first 
condition is that between any two actions, the one that offers the higher SM maximum 
potential income induces higher generosity. The second requirement is that the 
increase of the FM’s maximum potential income does not exceed the increase in the 
SM’s maximum potential income. In other words, the action cannot be self-serving. 
As the feasible maximum potential incomes of an opportunity set are properly 
defined, generosity in this theory is determined in an observable and unambiguous 
way. This is unlike in psychological games that work with individual’s beliefs that are 
not directly observable, are of a high order, and elicitation of which can be 
problematic, due to belief elicitation affecting behavior (or vice versa) (e.g. Gächter 
and Renner, 2010). We therefore use Revealed Altruism as our framework for 
answering our research question. Revealed Altruism, however, makes no explicit 
predictions about the reciprocal response to self-serving but generous actions. Rather, 
it states that actions cannot be self-serving, meaning self-serving generosity is outside 
the scope of the theory. We therefore expand the Revealed Altruism theory by 
positing that self-serving actions will elicit a diminished reciprocal response than 
selfless actions.   
Using the maximum payoff in our definition of self-serving generosity follows from 
Revealed Altruism. The FM’s maximum payoff may seem like an unintuitive choice 
for considering the FM’s intentions, as the SM is unlikely to desire an allocation that 
assigns all available surplus to the FM, which leaves nothing to the SM. In situations 
where allocations near the FM’s maximum payoff are considered unlikely, self-
serving and selfless generosity (under the current definition) might be 
indistinguishable from one another and in such cases one might consider an 
alternative definition based around the minimum payoffs of the pair, or some other 
reference payoff instead. Another suggestion could be what the FM believes he will 
receive back, however, that returns to the issue of (potentially problematic) beliefs. In 
defense of the maximum payoff, it is plausible that there is correlation between the 
maximum payoff and the SM’s second order belief, the operative belief that the SM 
would be using to assess the intentions of the FM. If the maximum payoff the FM can 
receive increases, it is not unreasonable to propose that the FM expects to receive 
more back. Therefore, the FM’s maximum payoff becomes a proxy for the SM’s 
second-order beliefs about the FM’s actions, with the main added advantage of being 
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directly observable.
4
 Ultimately, we retain the use of maximum payoffs in our 
definition while keeping the above issues in mind. 
CFS provide some support for their second condition, using data from Andreoni, 
Harbaugh & Vesterlund’s (2003) Carrot & Stick game. In the Carrot & Stick game, 
the FM can split $2.40 between himself and the SM, with a minimum of 40 cents 
being sent to the SM. The game has three variants, the Carrot Game, in which the SM 
can spend 1 cent to reward the FM by 5 cents, the Stick Game, in which the SM can 
spend 1 cent to punish the FM by 5 cents, and the Carrot & Stick Game, in which the 
SM can either reward or punish the FM at the rates previously described.
5
 If we 
compare the Stick variant to the Carrot & Stick variant, the same FM split decision 
differ in their MGT ordering according to the second condition. This is because SMs 
cannot reward FMs in the Stick variant, making generosity selfless, compared to the 
potentially self-serving generosity in the Carrot & Stick variant. While CFS do report 
statistical evidence in support of our conjecture, this is not sufficient to answer our 
research question. The SM’s action sets change between only being able to punish (or 
do nothing), to being able to punish and reward (or do nothing). Such a change could 
influence behavior for reasons other than self-serving generosity. For example 
consider the observed individual behavior between Dictator games where FMs could 
‘give’ money to the SM, or ‘take’ money from the SM (e.g. Bardsley, 2008; Cappelen 
et al., 2013; Cox et al., 2016), where the addition of the option to take reversed FM 
preferences from giving to taking. Such an effect potentially confounds these Carrot 
& Stick results on self-serving generosity, which motivates our experimental design 
as a cleaner, specific, test of whether self-serving generosity diminishes the reciprocal 
response compared to selfless generosity. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
3.1. Revealed Altruism Theory 
The following section provides a comprehensive overview of Revealed Altruism. CFS 
develop a model of reciprocity in the spirit of neoclassical economic theory. Suppose 
there are two players, ‘me’, and ‘you’.6 Let ‘my’ income be denoted m and ‘your’ 
income be denoted y. ‘My’ preferences over m and y are smooth, convex and strictly 
increasing in m. Well-behaved preference can be represented by a general utility 
function denoted 𝑢(𝑚, 𝑦), which has a positive partial derivative with respect to m, or 
𝜕𝑢(𝑚,𝑦)
𝜕𝑚
> 0, meaning ‘my’ utility is increasing in m. The partial derivative with 
                                                          
4
 What definition best approximates self-serving generosity under what circumstances is an interesting 
empirical question in its own right; however, we leave such explorations for future research. 
5
 SMs can spend the entirety of the amount they are sent by the FM, but are limited in not reducing the 
FM’s final payoff below zero. 
6
 The theory is general (N players), however, the two player case is presented for ease of explanation. 
We present the theory in its original version, where ‘me’ represents the SM and ‘you’ the FM. 
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respect to y, 
𝜕𝑢(𝑚,𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
, could be zero everywhere if ‘I’ am selfish, or could be positive or 
negative depending on ‘my’ benevolence or malevolence, respectively. The marginal 
rate of substitution of m for y, is represented in Equation 1. 
𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑚𝑦 =
𝜕𝑢(𝑚,𝑦)
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑢(𝑚,𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
,  (1) 
Equation 1 is undefined for selfish preferences (as 
𝜕𝑢(𝑚,𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
= 0), and swings from +∞ 
to -∞ as preferences pass from slight benevolence to slight malevolence, so it is 
convenient to instead use willingness to pay, as presented in Equation 2. 
 𝑊𝑇𝑃 =  
1
𝑀𝑅𝑆
=
𝜕𝑢(𝑚,𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑢(𝑚,𝑦)
𝜕𝑚
= 𝑤.  (2) 
The willingness to pay, w, represents the amount of m ‘I’ am willing to give up in 
order to increase y by one unit. Note that w is intrinsic, i.e., it is invariant to 
monotonic transformations of u(.). A more altruistic than (MAT) preference ordering 
is defined as follows. Let A and B be two preference orderings over m and y. A is 
MAT B if, for a given domain D, 𝑤𝐴(𝑚, 𝑦) ≥ 𝑤𝐵(𝑚, 𝑦), ∀(𝑚, 𝑦) ∈ 𝐷, or in other 
words, ‘my’ willingness to pay in A either exceeds or is equal to ‘my’ willingness to 
pay in B, at any allocation (m,y) from D.   
‘Your’ action creates an opportunity set, F. Let 𝑦𝐹
∗  be ‘your’ maximum feasible 
income in F, and similarly let 𝑚𝐹
∗  be ‘my’ maximum feasible income in F. An action 
that creates an opportunity set G is considered MGT an action that creates an 
opportunity set F if it meets the following two conditions presented in Equations 3 
and 4: 
  Condition A. 𝑚𝐺
∗ − 𝑚𝐹
∗ ≥ 0  (3) 
Condition B. 𝑚𝐺
∗ − 𝑚𝐹
∗ ≥ 𝑦𝐺
∗ − 𝑦𝐹
∗  (4) 
In other words, Condition A states that G is MGT F, if G provides ‘me’ with at least 
as much if not more potential income than F. Condition B states the set G cannot 
increase ‘your’ potential income by more than ‘mine’, compared to F.  
The Revealed Altruism model includes two axioms, Axiom R and Axiom S. Axiom R 
refers to reciprocity, the concept of rewarding (or punishing) good (bad) actions. 
More formally, Axiom R states:  
“Let the first mover choose the actual opportunity set for the second mover 
from the collection C. If F,G ∈ C and G is MGT F, then 𝐴𝐺  is MAT 𝐴𝐹.”
7
 
 (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008, p. 40).  
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 𝐴𝑋 is the preference ordering after observing the action that creates opportunity set X, where X ∈ C. 
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Therefore, if the opportunity set following your action is MGT of an alternative 
feasible opportunity set, then it will be met with a MAT response. In other words, if 
‘your’ action increases ‘my’ potential earnings without increasing ‘yours’ by more, 
then my choice will be more generous. Axiom S, which however is not relevant for 
our research question, states that acts of commission elicit stronger reciprocal 
response than acts of omission.  
 
3.2.Conjecture and Extension of Revealed Altruism 
It is with the preceding framework in mind that we present our conjectures on self-
serving generosity. Condition B (Equation 4) is related to the proposed concept of 
self-serving generosity. It effectively states that two opportunity sets cannot be MGT 
ordered if a generous action is self-serving. Condition B could be interpreted as a 
domain in which, when it is satisfied, predictions from the Revealed Altruism theory 
are defined. Outside of this domain the CFS version of the theory does not offer 
predictions. We next posit how Condition B affects the MGT ordering. 
If the inequality of Condition B is not satisfied, this could affect the MGT ordering. 
We define an action that satisfies Condition B as a selfless action. A selfless action 
potentially benefits the recipient by more (or at least as much) as the proposer, and it 
is unambiguous that the action is generous. We define an action that violates 
Condition B as self-serving. In the case of a self-serving action, the FM potentially 
stands to gain more than the SM, so the FM’s kind intentions of any generous but 
self-serving action are not clearly revealed. We propose that if both actions are equal 
in MGT ordering according to Condition A (i.e. they both make the recipient equally 
better off), a selfless action is considered MGT a self-serving action. If a MGT action 
elicits a MAT response, we therefore posit that a selfless action will elicit a MAT 
response than a self-serving action.   
Figure 1 presents our conjecture graphically in terms of opportunity sets over my 
income (m), and your income (y). Consider the status quo opportunity set F, where 
𝑦𝐹
∗ = 𝑚𝐺
∗ = 5, and three alternative opportunity sets G, H, and I, where 𝑚∗ = 6, but 
𝑦∗ varies. Opportunity sets G and H satisfy both Condition A and Condition B and are 
thus MGT F. Opportunity set I satisfies by Condition A but not Condition B. Note, we 
cannot specify an MGT ordering of G, H, and I by Condition A alone, instead we 
refer to Condition B. We propose that G is MGT F, H, and I; H is MGT F and I; and I 
is MGT F. 
10 
 
 
Figure 1 – Illustration of selfless and self-serving generosity. 
 
4. Experiment 1  
In general it is quite difficult to acquire data on reciprocal behavior from everyday 
situations, due to the private nature of many interactions. Even if such interactions 
were observable, it would be difficult to infer intent, as there are numerous other 
considerations at play. For example, interaction between two parties is often subject to 
repetition, meaning motivations may include reputation-building. Even in one-shot 
interactions, there are motivations such as social norms or social pressure that could 
confound any attempt to investigate the impact of self-serving actions on reciprocity. 
A solution is to conduct a one-shot interaction in controlled laboratory conditions. 
The non-repeated nature of the interaction strips away some motivations not related to 
the research question, and a sufficiently calibrated design removes any remaining 
confounds, leaving only the motivations in question to be studied. 
 
4.1.Design 
To explore our conjecture, we employ the Lost Wallet Game, henceforth LWG 
(Dufwenberg & Gneezy 2000).  In the LWG, presented in Figure 2, a First Mover can 
choose either IN or OUT. If the FM chooses OUT, he receives his outside option x, 
and the Second Mover receives nothing. If the FM chooses IN, then $20 is made 
11 
 
available for the SM to split between the pair with y going to the FM and 20-y to the 
SM. 
Our objective is to test whether a violation of Condition B affects the reciprocal 
response, and in order to do so, we hold all other factors that could affect the MGT 
ordering constant, mainly Condition A. In the LWG Condition A is constant 
regardless of x, as the SM always stands to gain up to $20. We can make changes to 
Condition B by varying x, which will vary how beneficial it is to the FM to choose 
IN, and subsequently how selfless or self-serving choosing IN is. 
 
 
Figure 2 – The Lost Wallet Game 
 
As the FM stands to gain up to 20-x, for all positive x, choosing IN is selfless, as the 
FM’s maximum potential income will always be less than the SM’s (who always 
stands to gain up to 20). In order to make choosing IN self-serving, we implement a 
negative x, which makes our implementation of the LWG novel and unique. We 
therefore propose two treatments, a Selfless treatment where x=4, and a Self-Serving 
treatment where x=-2.
8
 Intuitively, a FM is being selfless when he gives up $4 to 
choose IN, compared to when he gains $2 by choosing IN. By the theory, in the x=-2 
                                                          
8
In Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), x took the values of 4, 7, 10, 13, and 16.  In our experiment we 
chose x=4 for replication purposes, and x=-2 as it was the first negative instance counting down in steps 
of three from x=4. 
1 
OUT x 
0 
IN 
2 
0 20 
y 
y 
20-y 
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treatment, choosing IN is self-serving, as the FM stands to gain up to $22, whereas the 
SM stands to gain only up to $20. The negative outside option is implemented by a 
reduction in the subject’s show-up fee. 
Additionally, in a questionnaire administered at the end of the experiment we elicit 
non-incentivized beliefs about generosity and on other subject’s actions. We elicit 
subject perceptions about generosity using a 5-point scale (Likert 1932), where 1 is 
not generous and 5 is very generous. We ask both the FMs and SMs whether they 
considered the FM’s choice of IN to be generous. This manipulation check allows us 
to shed further light on the potential MGT ordering.  
 
4.2. Hypotheses 
The crux of our experiment, testing whether potential self-serving considerations 
behind generous behavior are important to reciprocity, comes down to the following 
three main hypotheses. For the ease of explanation, we present the hypotheses (and 
results) in parallel to the Revealed Altruism theory, i.e. we first establish support for 
whether the MGT ordering holds and only then focus on the MAT response, which is 
directly related to our research question. 
We conjecture that choosing IN in the Selfless x=4 treatment is MGT to choosing IN 
in the Self-Serving x=-2 treatment, as the two actions are of equivalent MGT ordering 
by Condition A, but vary by Condition B. Firstly, if an action has a higher MGT 
ordering, then we expect FMs and SMs to perceive that action as being more 
generous.
9
 
H1: FMs and SMs will perceive choosing IN as being more generous in the 
Selfless treatment x=4 than in the Self-Serving x=-2 treatment. 
Secondly, since choosing IN is self-serving for the FM when x=-2, and selfless for the 
FM when x=4, we expect that more FMs will choose IN when doing so is self-
serving: 
H2: FMs will choose IN more often in the Self-Serving x=-2 treatment than in 
the Selfless x=4 treatment. 
Finally, in the theory of Revealed Altruism a MGT action elicits a MAT response. In 
our design SMs should therefore allocate a larger proportion of the $20 to the FM (y) 
if choosing IN is indeed MGT. 
H3: SMs will choose a higher y in the Selfless x=4 treatment than in the Self-
Serving x=-2 treatment.  
                                                          
9
 Note that while MGT and MAT orderings are defined as weak relations (see Cox et al., 2008), we 
formulate our hypotheses as strong inequalities, for a more conservative test of our proposed 
conjecture. 
13 
 
4.3. Procedures 
The experiment was run in the New Zealand Experiment Economics Laboratory at the 
University of Canterbury. 154 student subjects, recruited using the online recruitment 
system ORSEE (Greiner 2015), participated, with 74 subjects (= 37 observations) in 
the Self-Serving x=-2 treatment, and 80 subjects (= 40 observations) in the Selfless 
x=4 treatment. Subjects participated in one treatment only, making this design 
between-subjects. Subjects were on average paid NZ$ 18.78, with all sessions lasting 
approximately 50 minutes.
10
 In a session, subjects were checked-in, signed a consent 
form, and then handed neutrally framed instructions (included in Appendix A). They 
were given approximately three minutes to read the instructions by themselves, after 
which the instructions were read aloud while also projected onto a screen at the front 
of the lab. Subjects made their decisions in a program implemented in z-Tree 
(Fischbacher 2007). Each terminal was randomly assigned a pair and role by the 
software. FMs chose IN or OUT by selecting the relevant radio button on the 
computer screen. If a FM chose OUT, he would receive $x (x=4 or x=-2 depending on 
treatment) and the SM would receive nothing. The $-2 outside option was enforced by 
reducing the FMs’ $5 show-up fee to $3, so instead of receiving $5 in addition to their 
experiment earnings, they would receive $3. As the FMs were making their decision, 
SMs chose how much money to allocate to the FM, y, conditional on the FM choosing 
IN, i.e. the game was played using the strategy method (Selten 1967, Brandts & 
Charness 2011). If a FM chose IN, then the division of the $20 the SM decided on 
would be enacted. After all subjects had completed their decisions, they were 
informed they were to receive $5 for filling out a questionnaire in addition to their 
show up fee. This previously unannounced payment for filling out the questionnaire 
was to increase subjects’ effort in the questionnaire, which contained the generosity 
perception elicitation as the first question. Finally, subjects were asked to come to the 
payout room one by one to receive their earnings in private, and then left the lab. The 
experimenter was aware of an individual’s payout, making the social distance 
protocol single-blind.  
 
4.4. Results 
Table 1 reports summary statistics and tests for both FMs and SMs. Recall that both 
FMs and SMs were asked on a 5-point scale how generous they thought choosing IN 
was (with 5 being very generous, and 1 being not generous). H1 predicts that 
choosing IN when doing so is selfless will be considered more generous than 
choosing IN when it is self-serving. FMs reported an average generosity perception of 
3.83 in the Selfless x=4 treatment, and 3.14 in the Self-Serving x=-2 treatment. The 
averages are in the direction posited by H1, and the difference is statistically 
significant with the Mann-Whitney 2-sided test reporting p=.029.
11
  
                                                          
10
 Minimum wage in New Zealand was NZ$13.50 per hour at the time of the experiments. 
11
 We adopt a conservative approach and report 2-sided tests throughout the paper. 
14 
 
SMs reported an average generosity perception of 3.30 in the Selfless x=4 treatment, 
and 2.73 in the Self-Serving x=-2 treatment. The averages are in the direction posited, 
and are statistically significant at the 10% level, with the Mann-Whitney test reporting 
p=.064.
12
 Our non-saliently elicited data thus provides evidence for H1, that both FMs 
and SMs consider choosing IN as being more generous when x=4 than when x=-2, in 
line with our conjecture. 
 
 
Table 1 – Experiment 1 Summary Statistics and Tests 
 
Panel A: First Movers 
Treatment Fraction that 
chose IN 
(percentage) 
Fisher’s 
exact 
test 
Mean 
Generosity 
Perception 
(standard 
deviation) 
Mann-Whitney 
test 
 
x=-2 (Self-
Serving) 
35/37 (95%) .049 3.14 
(1.42) 
.029 
 
x=4 (Selfless) 31/40 (78%) 3.83 
(1.03) 
Panel B: Second Movers 
Treatment Mean y 
(standard 
deviation) 
Mann-Whitney 
test 
 
Mean 
Generosity 
Perception 
(standard 
deviation) 
Mann-
Whitney test 
 
x=-2 (Self-
Serving) 
5.42 
(3.64) 
.992 
 
2.73 
(1.35) 
.064 
 
x=4 (Selfless) 5.45 
(3.52) 
3.30 
(1.11) 
All reported p-values are two-sided. 
                                                          
12
 A Mann-Whitney test on pooled data from both FMs and SMs reports p=.007. 
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Figure 3 – Experiment 1 SMs y decision by treatment 
 
Choosing IN in the current experiment was designed to be self-serving for the FM 
when x=-2, and selfless for the FM when x=4. H2 therefore predicted that more FMs 
will choose IN when doing so is self-serving than when it is selfless. Evidence 
presented in Panel A of Table 1 supports H3 as 95% of FMs chose IN in the x=-2 
treatment and 78% of FMs chose IN in the x=4 treatment. This difference is 
statistically significant according to the Fisher’s exact test (p=.049). 
Our design thus passes an important manipulation check: Both FMs and SMs consider 
choosing IN to be more generous in the Selfless x=4 treatment than in the Self-
Serving x=-2 treatment. FMs additionally choose IN more often when doing so is self-
serving.  
We now move onto SM behavior. If SMs consider IN being of differing levels of 
generosity, i.e. H1 is supported, then our reciprocity conjecture implies that SMs will 
subsequently be inclined to allocate more to the FM when IN is considered more 
generous, as predicted by H3.  
However, Table 1 reports no evidence in favor of H3. On average, SMs allocate 5.42 
to FMs in the Self-Serving x=-2 treatment, and 5.45 in the Selfless x=4 treatment, and 
there is no statistically significant difference (p=.992). We therefore reject H3 that 
SMs choose a higher y in the Selfless x=4 treatment than in the Self-Serving x=-2 
treatment. 
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3.5 Discussion 
H1supports our conjecture, based on a proposed revision of MGT ordering, as both 
FMs and SMs perceive our selfless treatment to be more generous than our self-
serving treatment. However, H3 does not support our MGT revision, as it has not 
borne out that an MGT action has elicited a MAT response, an important part of 
Revealed Altruism. Our finding of evidence in support of H1 but finding a lack of 
support for H3 is puzzling. SMs consider FMs to be less generous when they choose 
IN in our self-serving treatment, however, this elicits no difference in reciprocal 
response towards FMs.  
However, the empirical evidence of the LWG has shown that typically varying x does 
not have an effect on y (Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000; Servátka & Vadovič 2009; 
Cox, Servátka & Vadovič, 2010; and also the no negotiations treatments in 
Dufwenberg, Servátka & Vadovič, 2017), which seems to indicate a lack of positive 
reciprocity in this game. In light of this, Experiment 1 was perhaps a too conservative 
test of our conjecture. Our findings may be an artefact of the LWG itself. Cox, 
Servátka & Vadovič (2010) hypothesize that the observed lack of positive reciprocity 
could be driven by the opportunity set of the SM being invariant to the size of the 
foregone outside option of the FM, a notable difference with the Investment Game 
(Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe, 1995) where each dollar sent by the FM enlarges the SM 
opportunity set and where positive reciprocity is one of the driving factors of SM 
behavior (Cox, 2004). We therefore find it prudent to check the robustness of our 
findings in a different experimental design. 
 
5. Experiment 2 
5.1.Design 
For Experiment 2 we use the Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe, 1995). 
Unlike the Lost Wallet Game, Investment Game experiments have found SM 
behavior to be responsive to choices made by the FM (Johnson & Mislin, 2011), and 
will thus present a less conservative test of our conjecture. Recall that in order to test 
whether self-serving generosity leads to a weaker reciprocal response, we must hold 
Condition A constant while varying Condition B. One way of achieving this is in the 
Investment Game is to use different exchange rates on amounts kept by the SM, and 
amounts returned to the FM by the SM. To implement such exchange rates we adapt 
the procedures used by Andreoni & Miller (2002) for use in the Investment Game. 
Figure 4 presents our design. 
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Figure 4: Our Modified Investment Game 
 
The FM starts with ten tokens, and can choose IN or OUT. If the FM chooses OUT, 
then he earns ten points. If the FM chooses IN, then the ten tokens are made available 
for the SM to split. In all treatments, tokens that the SM holds for herself earn her 
three points per token, which holds Condition A constant across treatments.
13
 Tokens 
that the SM decides to send to the FM earn the FM s points, depending on treatment. 
SMs can send any integer amount of tokens from 0 to 10. By varying s we control 
how selfless or self-serving a FM choosing IN is. Note that the ‘channel’ in which we 
alter Condition B is different from Experiment 1, where the outside option was varied. 
The ‘channel’ is altered as a robustness check of Experiment 1, to avoid the potential 
artefactual issues of the LWG described previously. Choosing IN when s=4 is neither 
selfless nor self-serving by our definition, as FMs have a maximum potential gain of 
30 (they forgo 10 points to choose IN), which is the same as the SM’s maximum 
potential gain of 30 (which is invariant in s). Values of s smaller than 4 result in the 
choice of IN being selfless, and values larger than 4 result in the choice of IN being 
self-serving. We fix our Selfless treatment as s=2, and our Self-Serving treatment as 
s=6, to ensure sufficient and equal distance from our what would be ‘neutral’ s=4. 
  
                                                          
13
 Note the deliberate similarity to the Investment Game, where amounts invested by the FM are 
typically tripled for the SM to split. 
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Table 2 – Separation of Effects in Experiment 2 
 Fixed s=6 Random s=2 Random s=6 
Fixed s=2 Selflessness Effect 
Self-Serving Effect 
Surplus 
Maximization 
Selflessness Effect Selflessness Effect 
Surplus Maximization 
Fixed s=6 --- Self-Serving Effect 
Surplus 
Maximization 
Self-Serving Effect 
Random 
s=2 
--- --- Surplus 
Maximization 
Fixed s=2 and s=6 represent the respective treatments where s is fixed prior to the FM’s decision. 
Random s=2 represents the random treatment when s=2 eventuated. Random s=6 represents the 
random treatment when s=6 eventuated. 
 
Andreoni & Miller (2002) report that in their Dictator Game, a non-trivial number of 
subjects exhibit a desire to maximize surplus. If SMs behave similarly in our 
experiment, then they will want to allocate more tokens to FMs when s=6, as this 
maximizes surplus. This is a potential confound, and acts in the opposite direction of 
our hypothesis. In order to control for this, we implement a third Random treatment 
where there is a 50% chance s=2 eventuates, and a 50% chance s=6 eventuates. SMs 
are familiar with the nature of the FM’s decision. They are also informed which 
outcome has eventuated prior to their own decision, whereas FMs are not. The 
expected value of s is 4, so a FM choosing IN is being neither selfless nor self-serving 
in the Random treatment.
14
 Taking advantage of this fact, and comparing SM reaction 
to selfless or self-serving FM actions (where s is fixed prior to the FM decision to be 
2 and 6, respectively) to the corresponding neutral FM actions, we can separate out 
the confound of surplus maximization, as well as individually identify a SMs response 
                                                          
14
 CFS do not mention moves that are determined by chance, so we assume that MGT ordering is 
determined by the expected value of 𝑚𝐺
∗  and 𝑦𝐺
∗ . Such an assumption seems natural and intuitive, and a 
similar approach is used by Sebald (2010) to extend Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004). 
19 
 
to a selfless or self-serving FM action. Table 2 presents this identification of potential 
effects, with isolated effects in bold. 
 
5.2.Hypotheses 
Our conjecture remains the same as in Experiment 1, while our hypotheses change to 
fit the design of Experiment 2. Both FMs and SMs should perceive our Selfless s=2 
treatment to be more generous than both our neutral Random treatment and Self-
Serving s=6 treatment. FMs and SMs should also consider our neutral Random 
treatment to be more generous than our Self-serving s=6 treatment. 
H4: FMs and SMs will perceive choosing IN as being more generous:  
 in the Selfless s=2 treatment than in the Random treatment, 
 in the Random treatment than in the Self-serving s=6 treatment. 
Just as in Experiment 1, we expect the FMs’ behavior to correspond to how self-
serving or selfless choosing IN is. 
 H5: FMs will choose IN more often:  
 in the Self-serving s=6 treatment than in the Random treatment, 
 in the Random treatment than in the Selfless s=2 treatment, 
 in the Self-serving s=6 treatment than in the Selfless s=2 treatment. 
In terms of SM behavior, we focus our analysis on the isolated effects presented in 
Table 2. For the selflessness effect, we predict that SMs will allocate more to the FM 
in the Selfless s=2 treatment than when s=2 eventuates in the Random treatment. Such 
a reaction would be triggered by the FM being selfless by choosing IN when s is fixed 
to be 2, as opposed to having neither selfless nor self-serving intentions by choosing 
IN in the Random treatment. According to our conjecture, SMs may want to reward 
selflessly generous FMs more than neutrally generous FMs. 
An important consideration in our design is that because of the different token 
redemption rates (which determine the total number of points) between our 
treatments, the number of tokens allocated to the FM might vary because of the 
different redemption rate, rather than due to a change in reciprocity. Therefore, rather 
than stating our hypotheses using the number of tokens allocated to the FM, we 
formulate them in terms of the percentage of the total surplus.  
H6: SMs will allocate more surplus to the FM in the Selfless s=2 treatment 
than when s=2 eventuates in the Random treatment.  
For the self-serving effect, we expect that SMs will allocate more of the surplus to the 
FM in the Random treatment where s=6 eventuates than in the Self-Serving s=6 
treatment, as SMs may wish to reward neutrally generous FMs more than self-serving 
generous FMs. 
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H7: SMs will allocate more surplus to the FM when s=6 eventuates in the 
Random treatment than in the Self-Serving s=6 treatment.  
Finally, for the surplus maximization effect, we compare the two possible states of 
nature in the Random Treatment. We expect that SMs will allocate more of the 
surplus to the FM when s=6 eventuates, as it maximizes surplus, and it is relatively 
cheaper to do so. 
H8: In the Random treatment SMs will allocate more surplus to the FM when 
s=6 eventuates than when s=2 eventuates. 
 
5.3.Procedures 
Experiment 2 was also run in the New Zealand Experiment Economics Laboratory at 
the University of Canterbury. 222 subjects participated in total, with 64 subjects (= 32 
observations) in the Selfless s=2 treatment, 64 subjects (= 32 observations) in the 
Self-Serving s=6 treatment, and 94 subjects (= 47 observations) in the Random 
treatment. None of the Experiment 2 subjects participated in Experiment 1. Subjects 
were paid on average NZ$ 17.69, with all sessions lasting approximately 50 minutes. 
The procedures used in Experiment 2 replicate those of Experiment1. FMs made their 
IN or OUT decision by selecting the relevant option on their screen. If a FM chose 
OUT, then he would earn 10 points and his paired SM would earn 0 points. While the 
FMs were making their decisions, SMs were deciding how many of the 10 tokens to 
send to the FM and how many to keep for themselves, provided the FM chose IN. 
Tokens sent to the FM earns him s points and tokens kept by the SM earns her 3 
points. In the Random treatment, FMs were not informed of the realization of s when 
making their decision. SMs were informed of the realization of s before making their 
decision, and only made a decision for that realization of s. If a FM chose IN, then the 
proposed division of tokens by the SM would be implemented. After all subjects had 
completed their decisions, they were informed they were to receive $5 for filling out a 
questionnaire. As in Experiment 1, the additional payment was to increase subject’s 
effort in the questionnaire, of which, the generosity perception elicitation was 
presented first. After subjects had completed the questionnaires, they were asked to 
come one by one to the payout room to receive their earnings in private, where the 
points earned in the experiment were exchanged at the preannounced rate of $.60 
NZD per point.  
 
5.4.Results 
Table 3 reports summary statistics and statistical tests on both FM and SM behavior in 
Experiment 2. Because of our focus on isolating individual effects, we provide 
pairwise comparisons and statistical tests. 
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Table 3 – Experiment 2 Summary Statistics and Tests 
Panel A: First Movers 
Treatment Fraction 
that chose 
IN 
(percentage) 
Fisher’s 
exact test 
Mean 
Generosity 
Perception 
(st. dev.) 
Mann-Whitney 
test 
 
Selfless s=2  14/32 (44%) .131 .001
a
 3.94 
(1.01) 
 .205 
 
.249
b
 
 
Self-Serving 
s=6  
21/32 (66%) .187 3.59 
(1.13) 
.702 
 
Random  38/47 (81%) .001
a
 3.70 
(0.95) 
.249
b
 
 
Panel B: Second Movers 
Treatment Mean 
Surplus 
allocated 
to FM 
(st. dev.) 
Mann-Whitney 
 
Mean 
Generosity 
Perception 
(st. dev.) 
Mann-Whitney 
test 
 
Selfless s=2  27.0% 
(19.1%) 
.013 
 
.245
c
 
 
4.03 
(1.03) 
.082 
 
.277
e
 
 
Self-serving 
s=6  
40.4% 
(24.6%) 
.142
d
 
 
3.56 
(1.13) 
.855 
 
Random s=2  20.7% 
(19.7%) 
.0001 
 
.245
c
 
 
3.72 
(1.19) 
.277
e
 
 
Random s=6  50.1% 
(23.2%) 
.142
d
 
 
In the Selfless treatment s is fixed at 2; in the Self-Serving treatment s is fixed at 6. In the Random 
treatment s=2 and s=6 eventuates with 50% probability each. 
Statistical tests of differences are grouped in the same cell corresponding to the treatments in the same 
rows. Where this is not possible, p-values are reported twice in the same rows as the corresponding 
treatments, and paired using a letter superscript. 
All reported tests are 2-sided. 
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We start by exploring subject’s non-salient generosity perceptions. H4 predicts that 
choosing IN in the Selfless treatment will be perceived to be more generous than in 
the Random treatment, that choosing IN in the Selfless treatment will be perceived to 
be more generous than in the Self-Serving treatment, and that choosing IN will be 
perceived to be more generous in the Random treatment than in the Self-Serving 
treatment. 
FMs reported an average generosity perception of 3.94 in the Selfless treatment, 3.70 
in the Random treatment, and 3.59 in the Self-serving treatment. While the averages 
are in the hypothesized directions, there are no statistically significant differences 
between any of our treatments. We find no evidence in support of H4 from FM 
behavior. 
SMs reported an average generosity perception of 4.03 in the Selfless treatment, 3.72 
in the Random treatment, and 3.56 in the Self-Serving treatment. As with FMs, the 
averages are in the hypothesized direction, but unlike FMs, there exists a weak 
statistical difference between the Selfless and Self-Serving treatments, with the Mann 
Whitney test reporting p=.082.
15
 Therefore, there is some weak evidence in support of 
a part of H4, which is the most relevant comparison from the perspective of our 
research question. Regarding our findings on the differences in generosity perceptions 
being weaker in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, we note that it may be due to the 
increased complexity of Experiment 2, or the calibration providing a smaller 
magnitude of separation in generosity perception. 
We continue the analysis with the FM behavior. 44% of FMs chose IN in the Selfless 
treatment, 81% in the Random treatment, and 66% in the Self-Serving treatment. The 
Fisher’s exact test only reports a statistically significant difference in FM behavior 
between the Random and Selfless treatment (p=.001) with the difference between the 
Selfless and Self-Serving treatment being marginally insignificant (p=.131). We 
therefore find some evidence in support of a part of H5.  
As mentioned earlier, when analyzing SM decisions, it is helpful to report the 
percentage of the surplus allocated to the FM instead of the number of tokens for the 
comparison between treatments with differing token redemption rates. For 
comparability between all SM results, we report this percentage for all SM token 
allocations. We now test our hypotheses on SM behavior, starting with isolating the 
‘selflessness effect’. Hypothesis H6 predicts that SMs will allocate more of the 
surplus to the FM in the Selfless treatment than in the neutral Random treatment, 
where the same token redemption rate s=2 eventuates. The intuition behind the 
hypothesis is that SMs may want to more highly reward those FMs who exhibit 
selfless generosity, than those FMs who exhibit neutral generosity. 
                                                          
15
 Using pooled data of both FM and SM generosity perceptions, a Mann-Whitney test reports: for H4 
p=.073; for H5 p=.035; and for H6 p=.536.  Note that such an approach provides support for H5 and 
mild evidence in support of H4.  
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In the Selfless s=2 treatment, SMs on average allocated 27.0% of the surplus to FMs, 
while in the Random treatment where s=2 eventuated SMs on average allocated 
20.7%. The averages are in the hypothesized direction, however, this result is not 
statistically significant (p=.245). Therefore, we find no evidence in support of H6. 
In a similar line of reasoning to the selflessness effect, we hypothesize that SMs will 
respond by diminishing their reciprocity due to the ‘self-servingness’ effect as they 
may not want to reward FMs whose intentions could be self-serving. Hypothesis H7, 
capturing this effect, predicts that SMs will allocate more surplus in the neutral 
Random treatment where s=6 has eventuated by chance compared to the Self-serving 
s=6 treatment. 
In the Self-Serving s=6 treatment, SMs on average allocated 40.4% of the surplus to 
FMs, while in the Random treatment where s=6 eventuated SMs on average allocated 
50.1%. The averages are in the hypothesized direction, however, the difference is 
marginally insignificant (p=.142). Therefore, we find no evidence in support of H7. 
Our last hypothesis, H8, explores the need for our Random treatment to control for the 
possibility that SMs may wish to maximize surplus by allocating more to the FM 
when the redemption rate is higher. To do this, we compare the SM response to s=2 
and s=6 within our Random treatment. As the FM’s intentions are constant in the 
Random treatment, we can focus on the effect of the differing s. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Experiment 2 - SM surplus allocation decision CDFs when s=2 by 
treatment 
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Figure 6 – Experiment 2 - SM surplus allocation decision CDFs when s=6 by 
treatment 
 
When s=6 eventuated in the Random treatment, SMs allocated on average 50.1% of 
the surplus to FMs, whereas SMs allocated on average 20.7% when s=2 eventuated. 
This result is statistically significant (p=.0001), and provides strong evidence for H8. 
This finding justifies the need for our Random treatment to control for surplus 
maximization effects. If this effect was not controlled for, a confounded test of a 
combined selfless and self-serving effect, which directly compares SM behavior 
between our Selfless and Self-Serving treatment, would report a statistically 
significant difference (p=.013). To use this as evidence of self-serving generosity 
affecting reciprocity would be erroneous due to the presence of the surplus 
maximization effect. Alternatively, to separate out selfless and self-serving effects, 
one could introduce a treatment where s=4 without a random element. Such an 
approach would also be erroneous due to the presence of the surplus maximization 
effect. 
 
6. An Incentivized Elicitation of Generosity Perceptions 
Recall that in Experiment 1 we found that, despite no difference in the SM’s 
reciprocal response between our treatments, SMs perceived a FM’s choice of IN to be 
of differing levels of generosity. This contrast between generosity perception and 
reciprocal response warrants further investigation, as it raises into question the 
fundamentals of the general concept of positive reciprocity, “… a tendency to respond 
to perceived kindness with kindness…” (Sobel, 2005, pp 392). However, the 
generosity perception elicited in Experiment 1 was not incentivized, so in order to 
support our findings we conduct an additional generosity perception elicitation.
16
 
                                                          
16
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this additional elicitation. 
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In addition, our observations from Experiment 2 were that the mean SM perception of 
generosity matched our conjecture, however (weak) statistical significance was only 
found for one of the three comparisons. Again, the generosity perceptions were not 
incentivized, so an additional incentivized elicitation could confirm whether the non-
incentivized elicitation was the reason for the lack of statistical significance of these 
observations. Furthermore, since the generosity perceptions were elicited after the 
decisions, it is possible that they were not considered at the time when the decisions 
were made and only prompted by the generosity survey question itself. 
We use a within-subject design for the incentivized elicitation, i.e. we ask subjects to 
consider the generosity of a FM choosing IN of both the Self-Serving x=-2 and 
Selfless x=4 treatments of Experiment 1, as well as the Self-Serving s=6, Random, 
and Selfless s=2 treatments of Experiment 2. As subjects see all treatments in the 
incentivized elicitation it alleviates potential concerns that by chance a group of 
subjects in one treatment have different ratings tendencies than another. At the same 
time, it is possible that an ‘experimenter demand effect’ may be present, in that 
subjects would change their generosity perceptions based on what changes in the 
treatment.
17
 In order to minimize this, we ask subjects to consider the generosity 
perception of the subjects that participated in Experiment 1 and 2, who did not 
observe the other treatments, and this point is emphasized in the instructions.
18
 
Subjects’ answers were incentivized based on how closely they could guess the 
average generosity perception using a quadratic scoring rule. Subjects were asked to 
consider only the SM’s generosity perceptions, as it is the SM’s perceptions that are 
important for the reciprocal response. Subjects were also read the instructions from 
Experiments 1 and 2, and were asked to complete incentivized control questions, to 
ensure their understanding of the environment that the previous subjects participated 
in. 
55 subjects, recruited through ORSEE (Greiner 2015), participated in the incentivized 
elicitation of generosity perceptions, which was conducted in the Vernon L. Smith 
Experimental Economics Laboratory at the Macquarie Graduate School of 
Management.
19
 Subjects were on average paid AU$ 23.94 and sessions lasted under 2 
hours. In a session, subjects were informed that they would be considering the 
generosity perceptions of the subjects that had participated in the previous 
experiments, and were first presented with Experiment 1. The instructions from 
Experiment 1 were read aloud, which was followed by control questions where 
subjects could earn AU$ 0.50 for each correct response. Then, subjects were asked to 
guess the average generosity perception of SMs that participated in Experiment 1 in 
each different treatment. They were rewarded for this guess based on a quadratic 
scoring rule of the form: 20 − 15 ∗ (𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙)2. This process was repeated 
for Experiment 2, the instructions were read aloud, incentivized control questions 
                                                          
17
 For a further discussion of the experimenter demand effect, see Zizzo (2010).  
18
 The instructions for the robustness check are included in Appendix C. 
19
 As the elicitation is run using a within-subject design rather than being directly compared to earlier 
treatments, different subject pools should not play a role. 
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were answered, and then the generosity perception guesses were elicited. At the end 
of the session, one of the guesses was randomly selected to be actually paid out, 
which was known to subjects before making their guesses, in order to control for a 
portfolio effect.  
The results of the incentivized elicitation are presented below in Table 4, with the 
results pertaining to Experiment 1 in Panel A, and Experiment 2 in Panel B. As the 
design was within-subject, the data are paired and thus the Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
was used. As Table 4, Panel A, shows, subjects in the robustness check were, on 
average, able to predict the average generosity perception of the previous subjects 
reasonably well in Experiment 1. There is evidence of a difference of generosity 
perceptions between the x=-2 and x=4 treatments at the 10% level, providing 
additional support for H1. Panel B reports that subjects on average did not guess that 
the previous subjects in Experiment 2 perceived the different treatments as being of 
different levels of generosity. One might think that this result could be driven by 
confusion or a lack of understanding of the more complicated environment of 
Experiment 2, especially considering subjects in the incentivized elicitation did not 
actually participate in the original experiment. A lack of understanding of instructions 
of Experiment 2, however, was likely not an issue. Panel C presents data from only 
those subjects who scored above 80% on the Experiment 2 control questions, as these 
subjects are more likely to have understood the environment. However, this restriction 
does not change the overall findings. Recall that in Experiment 2, amongst SMs there 
was only a statistically significant difference between the s=2 and s=6 treatments at 
the 10% level, so the results of incentivized elicitation do not differ substantially from 
the original experiment. 
Taken together, generosity perceptions in both Experiment 1 and the additional 
incentivized generosity perceptions point out that choosing IN was perceived to be 
less generous when x=-2 than when x=4, as suggested by our accepted definitions of 
self-serving and selfless generosity, confirming that the Lost Wallet Game is indeed 
an appropriate environment to test our conjecture. 
While the design of Experiment 2 employs the same definitions and therefore ex ante 
satisfies the theoretical requirements for testing our conjecture, we find only a weak 
statistical difference in generosity perceptions between the Selfless and Self-Serving 
treatments in the actual experiment and no statistical differences in the robustness 
check. As hypothesized earlier, the increased complexity of the Investment Game 
environment or its calibration might make the differences in generosity levels (of 
choosing IN) less salient in the existing treatments.  
Importantly, however, the results of Experiment 2 confirm those of Experiment 1 in 
that self-serving generosity does not lead to weaker reciprocity than selfless 
generosity. Thus from the statistical point of view this corroborated evidence 
increases the confidence in our findings compared to a situation if the data were 
generated in one environment only.   
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Table 4 – Incentivized Generosity Perceptions Statistics and Tests 
Panel A: Experiment 1 
Treatment Actual Average Guess Average Wilcoxon test 
x=-2 2.73 2.79 p=.080 
x=4 3.30 3.16 
Panel B: Experiment 2 (Full sample) 
Treatment Actual Average Guess Average Wilcoxon test 
s=2 4.03 3.24 p=.903 p=.622
a 
s=6 3.56 3.21 p=.815 
Random 3.72 3.21 p=.622
a 
Panel C: Experiment 2 (Restricted sample) 
Treatment Actual Average Guess Average Wilcoxon test 
s=2 4.03 3.29 p=.744 p=.712
a 
s=6 3.56 3.17 p=.182 
Random 3.72 3.36 p=.712
a 
Statistical tests of differences are grouped in the same cell corresponding to the treatments in the same 
rows. Where this is not possible, p-values are reported twice in the same rows as the corresponding 
treatments, and paired using a letter superscript. 
All reported tests are 2-sided. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Life is full of examples where people pretend to be kind, but do so because their 
exhibited kindness has the potential to benefit them. Do beneficiaries of such kind 
actions care about their self-serving nature and take it into account when responding? 
Our intuition, supported by prior empirical evidence on the importance of intentions, 
tells us they might care. We set out to study whether self-serving generosity, which is 
a particular type of kindness, affects reciprocal behavior. The novelty of our approach 
lies in manipulating the nature of intentions (as opposed to only removing them), 
which is central to understanding of reciprocal preferences. 
Utilizing the framework of Revealed Altruism, we developed a conjecture on how 
selfless and self-serving generosity impacts reciprocal behavior. We defined actions 
that satisfied Revealed Altruism’s Condition B to be selfless, and actions that violated 
Condition B to be self-serving. We proposed that self-serving but generous actions are 
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less generous than selfless actions, and should therefore elicit a diminished reciprocal 
response. Using novel designs that varied whether an action was selfless or self-
serving while holding other generosity considerations constant, we found no 
difference in reciprocal response to selfless and self-serving (but equally generous) 
offers. This is despite the fact that subjects generally considered our selfless and self-
serving treatments to be of differing levels of generosity. 
Most theories of (positive) reciprocity can generally be condensed down to a 
‘primitive’, a desire to reward generous actions. It follows that the desire to reward 
would increase with how generous the action is; meaning our finding of differences in 
generosity perception (in particular in Experiment 1) but not reciprocal behavior is 
puzzling. Our original elicitation of subjects’ generosity perception was non-salient, 
however, we replicated the differences in generosity perception with an elicitation 
utilizing a salient proper scoring rule (see Schlag, Tremewan & van der Weele, 2015, 
for a review). Our findings suggest there is more work to be done on the channels 
through which reciprocity operates, in order to fully understand this important 
economic phenomenon. 
SM behavior in our experiments may be explained by SMs giving FMs the ‘benefit of 
the doubt’, and assuming FMs have selfless rather than self-serving intentions when 
both could be present, a finding akin to Cox & Deck (2006). A design where FMs 
must choose a self-serving generous option over a selfless or neutral generous option 
could control for the ‘benefit of the doubt’. However, such a design would likely 
require the use of ‘inefficient strategies’ (Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004), 
characterized by the existence of another strategy that for at least one player increases 
material payout without reducing the payout of other players. In such a design, our 
conjectured effects would be confounded by inefficient alternatives potentially not 
being considered credible. 
Apart from providing empirical evidence that people do not seem to respond to self-
serving intentions, our results have important theoretical implications. In particular, 
our data suggest that Revealed Altruism might not need the restriction of Condition B 
in a MGT ordering, as it appears to have no impact on the MAT response and that a 
‘MGT light’ ordering (proposed by CFS, p. 36), which only includes Condition A, 
may be sufficient. Such a refinement of Revealed Altruism would increase the 
parsimony of the theory, without reducing its descriptive and predictive properties. A 
SM appears to only consider what a generous action means for her own payoff, and 
this consideration appears to dominate any ulterior intentions a FM may have. 
However, we also acknowledge that more research would be required to confidently 
remove Condition B from Revealed Altruism, such as robustness checks over 
different sets of parameters and environments (e.g. consider a situation when the FM 
could gain $1M while the SM only $1), investigating Condition B’s effects over 
negative reciprocity, and investigating the potential interaction effects of Conditions 
A and B.  
29 
 
References 
 
Andreoni, J., Harbaugh, W. & Vesterlund, L. 2003. 'The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, 
Punishments, and Cooperation.' American Economic Review, 93:3, 893-902. 
Andreoni, J. & Miller, J. 2002. 'Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of 
the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism.' Econometrica, 70:2, 737-53. 
Bardsley, N. 2008. 'Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?' Experimental 
Economics, 11:2, 122-33. 
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J. & McCabe, K. 1995. 'Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History.' 
Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122-42. 
Blount, S. 1995. 'When Social Outcomes Aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal 
Attributions on Preferences.' Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 63:2, 131-44. 
Bolton, G. E. & Ockenfels, A. 2000. 'ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and 
Competition.' American Economic Review, 90:1, 166-93. 
Brandts, J. & Charness, G. 2011. 'The Strategy versus the Direct-response Method: A 
First Survey of Experimental Comparisons.' Experimental Economics, 14, 
375-398. 
Bruni, L., Corazzini, L. & Stanca, L. 2009. 'Testing theories of reciprocity: Do 
motivations matter?' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71:2, 
233-245. 
Camerer, C. F. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Cappelen, A. W., Nielsen, U. H., Sørensen, E. Ø., Tungodden, B. & Tyran, J.-R. 
2013. 'Give and take in dictator games.' Economic Letters, 118:2, 280-83. 
Charness, G. B. 2004. 'Attribution and Reciprocity in an Experimental Labor Market.' 
Journal of Labor Economics, 22:3, 665-88. 
Charness, G. & Dufwenberg, M. 2006. ‘Promises and Partnership.’ Econometrica, 
74:6, 1579-1601. 
Charness, G. & Rabin, M. 2002. 'Understanding Social Preferences with Simple 
Tests.' The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117:3, 817-69. 
Chaudhuri, A. 2008. Experiments in Economics: Playing fair with money. Routledge. 
Cox, J. C. 2004. 'How to identify trust and reciprocity.' Games and Economic 
Behavior, 46, 260-81. 
Cox, J. C. & Deck, C. A. 2005. 'On the Nature of Reciprocal Motives.' Economic 
Inquiry, 43:3, 623-35. 
Cox, J. C. & Deck, C. A. 2006. 'Assigning Intentions when Actions are Unobservable: 
The Impact of Trembling in the Trust Game.' Southern Economic Journal, 
73:2, 307-14. 
Cox, J. C., Friedman, D. & Gjerstad, S. 2007. ‘A tractable model of reciprocity and 
fairness.’ Games and Economic Behavior, 59:1, 17-45. 
Cox, J. C., Friedman, D. & Sadiraj, V. 2008. 'Revealed Altruism.' Econometrica, 
76:1, 31-69. 
Cox, J. C., List, J., Price, M., Sadiraj, V. & Samek, A. 'Moral Costs and Rational 
Choice: Theory and Experimental Evidence.' Working paper 2016. 
Cox, J. C., Sadiraj, K. & Sadiraj, V. 2008. 'Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity 
for modelling economic behavior.' Experimental Economics, 11:1, 1-24. 
Cox, J. C., Servátka, M. & Vadovič, R. 2010. 'Saliency of outside options in the lost 
wallet game.' Experimental Economics, 13:1, 66-74. 
30 
 
Cox, J. C., Servátka, M. & Vadovič, R. 2017. 'Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: 
Reciprocal Responses to Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission.' 
Experimental Economics, 20, 1-18. 
Dufwenberg, M. & Gneezy, U. 2000. 'Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost 
Wallet Game.' Games and Economic Behavior, 30:2, 163-82. 
Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G. 2004. 'A theory of sequential reciprocity.' Games 
and Economic Behavior, 47:2, 268-98. 
Dufwenberg, M., Servátka, M. & Vadovič, R. 2017. 'Honesty and Informal 
Agreements.' Games and Economic Behavior, 102, 2017, 269-285. 
Falk, A., Fehr, E. & Fischbacher, U. 2008. 'Testing theories of fairness - Intentions 
matter.' Games and Economic Behavior, 62:1, 287-303. 
Falk, A. & Fischbacher, U. 2006. 'A theory of reciprocity.' Games and Economic 
Behavior, 54:2, 293-315. 
Fehr, E. & Gächter, S. 2000. 'Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of 
Reciprocity.' The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14:3, 159-81. 
Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. M. 1999. 'A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and 
Cooperation.' The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114:3, 817-68. 
Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. M. 2006. 'The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and 
Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories.' In S. Kolm & J. M. 
Ythier (Eds.) Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity. 
Elsevier. 
Fischbacher, U. 2007. 'z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic 
Experiments.' Experimental Economics, 10:2, 171-78. 
Gaechter, S. & Renner, E. 2010. ‘The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in 
public goods experiments.’ Experimental Economics, 13:3, 364-377. 
Gneezy, U., Güth, W. & Verboven, F. 2000. 'Presents or investments? An 
experimental analysis.' Journal of Economic Psychology, 21:5, 481-93. 
Greiner, B. 2015. 'Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with 
ORSEE' Journal of the Economic Science Association, 1:1, 114-25. 
Hinz, J. & Nicklisch, A. 2015. ‘Reciprocity Models Revisited: Intention Factors and 
Reference Value.’ Hamburg Wiso Working Paper Series 2015/25. 
Johnson, N. D. & Mislin, A. A. 2011. 'Trust games: A meta-analysis.' Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 32, 865-89. 
Kritikos, A. & Bolle, F. 2004. 'Approaching Fair Behavior: Distributional and 
Reciprocal Preferences.' Research on Economic Inequality, 11, 149-81. 
Likert, R. 1932. A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes. New York. 
Offerman, T. 2002. 'Hurting hurts more than helping helps.' European Economic 
Review, 46:8, 1423-37. 
Rabin, M. 1993. 'Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics.' American 
Economic Review, 83:5, 1281-302. 
Schlag, K., Tremewan, J. & van der Weele, J. 2015. 'A Penny for Your Thoughts: A 
Survey of Methods for Eliciting Beliefs.' Experimental Economics, 18:3, 457-
490. 
Sebald, A. 2010. ‘Attribution and reciprocity’. Games and Economic Behavior, 68:1, 
339-352. 
Selten, R. 1967. 'Die Strategiemethode zur Erforshung des eingeschränkt rationalen 
Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments.' In H. Sauermann (Ed.) 
Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung: 136-68. Tübingen: Mohr. 
Servátka, M. & Vadovič, R. 2009. 'Unequal outside options in the lost wallet game.' 
Economics Bulletin, 29:4, 2870-83. 
31 
 
Sobel, J. 2005. 'Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity.' Journal of Economic 
Literature, 43, 392-436.e 
Woods, D. & Servátka, M. Testing Psychological Forward Induction and the 
Updating of Beliefs in the Lost Wallet Game," Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 56, 2016, 116-125. 
Woods, D. (2013). Does Self-serving Generosity DiminishReciprocal Behaviour. 
(M.Com.), University of Canterbury, Christchurch.  
Zizzo, D. J. (2010). Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments. 
Experimental Economics, 13(1), 75-98. 
 
 
  
32 
 
Appendix A – Experiment 1 Instructions 
 
Instructions in ( ) are relevant to the x=-2 treatment, and  [ ] to the x=4 treatment. 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk.  If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
Show up Fee 
Every participant will get $5 as a show up fee, and in addition you may earn money in 
the experiment. All the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
Anonymity  
You will be divided randomly into two groups, called Group 1 and Group 2. Each 
person in Group 1 will be anonymously paired with a person in Group 2.  No one will 
learn the identity of the person he/she is paired with. 
Structure of the experiment 
This experiment is computerised, meaning you will be entering your decisions on the 
computer in front of you.  If you have any trouble entering your decisions, please raise 
your hand to alert the experimenter who will assist you. 
The Group 1 Decision Task 
Each person in Group 1 will have two options: 
 (To choose OUT and receive $-2, which will be subtracted from their show 
up fee.) [To choose OUT and receive $4.] In this case the paired Group 2 
person with whom he/she is paired makes no decision. 
 To choose IN. In that case the paired person in Group 2 will get to split $20 
between the pair. That is, the person in Group 2 will decide how much of the 
$20, between $0 and $20, to give to the person in Group 1, and how much to 
keep. 
Group 1 persons enter their decisions by selecting the relevant option on the screen, 
followed by clicking OK. 
The Group 2 Decision Task 
If the Group 1 person chooses IN, then $20 will be made available to split between 
the two paired persons. The split will be determined by the Group 2 person.  Each 
Group 2 person will be asked to decide how much money out of $20 to give to the 
Group 1 person with whom he/she is paired. Group 2 persons are asked to enter their 
decision in the relevant text box followed by clicking OK.  Note that this decision by 
the Group 2 person will only be relevant if the Group 1 person chose IN. 
Payment of Show up Fees and Experiment Earnings 
All participants are asked to sit patiently until the end of the experiment. Once all 
Group 2 persons have made their decisions, you will be presented with a summary 
screen of your earnings.  Click OK after you have seen this screen, so other 
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participants cannot see your decisions.  You will then be prompted to complete a 
Questionnaire.  After the Questionnaire, you will be asked one by one to enter the 
payment room at the back of the lab for the payment of your earnings. Because your 
decision is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings 
either during or after the experiment. We also ask you to not gather near the lab after 
you receive your payment. 
Are there any questions? 
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Appendix B – Experiment 2 Instructions 
(Fixed Treatments) 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk.  If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
Show up Fee 
Every participant will get $5 as a show up fee, and in addition you may earn money in 
the experiment. All the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
Anonymity  
You will be divided randomly into two groups, called Group 1 and Group 2. Each 
person in Group 1 will be anonymously paired with a person in Group 2. No one will 
learn the identity of the person he/she is paired with. 
Structure of the experiment 
This experiment is computerised, meaning you will be entering your decisions on the 
computer in front of you.  If you have any trouble entering your decisions, please raise 
your hand to alert the experimenter who will assist you. 
Tokens and Points 
The currency used in this experiment are Tokens.  As you make decisions with these 
Tokens, you and your paired person will earn points.  Every point that people earn in 
this experiment will be worth 60 cents.  For example, if you earn 8 points you will 
make $4.80 from the decision part of the experiment. 
The Group 1 Decision Task 
Each person in Group 1 will have two options: 
 To choose OUT and receive 10 Tokens, earning 10 points.  In this case the 
paired Group 2 person with whom he/she is paired makes no decision, and 
earns 0 points. 
 To choose IN. In that case the paired person in Group 2 will get to split 10 
Tokens between the pair. That is, the person in Group 2 will decide how 
many of the 10 Tokens, to pass to the person in Group 1, and how many to 
hold for themselves.  Tokens that are passed or held will earn different 
amounts of points, which is explained in the Group 2 Decision Task.   
Group 1 persons enter their decision by selecting the relevant option on the screen, 
followed by clicking OK. 
The Group 2 Decision Task 
If the Group 1 person chooses IN, then 10 Tokens will be made available to split 
between the two paired persons. The split will be determined by the Group 2 person.  
Each Group 2 person will be asked to decide how many Tokens out of 10 to pass to 
the Group 1 person with whom he/she is paired, and how many Tokens to hold for 
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themselves.  Each Group 2 person must distribute all 10 Tokens, that is, the number of 
Tokens they pass and the number of Tokens they hold must sum to 10.  
 Tokens that are passed will earn their paired Group 1 person s points per 
Token.   
 Tokens that are held (i.e. the remainder of the 10 Tokens that are not passed) 
will earn the Group 2 person 3 points per Token.  
 
Group 2 persons enter their decisions in the relevant text box, followed by clicking 
OK.  Note that this decision by the Group 2 person will only be relevant if the Group 
1 person chose IN. 
Payment of Show up Fees and Experiment Earnings 
All participants are asked to sit patiently until the end of the experiment. Once 
everybody has made their decisions, you will be presented with a screen instructing 
you to wait.  Do not click OK until the experimenter asks you to do so. You will then 
answer a questionnaire, followed by a summary of your earnings, and finally another 
questionnaire.  Once this is complete, you will be asked one by one to enter the 
payment room at the back of the lab for the payment of your earnings. Because your 
decision is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings 
either during or after the experiment. We also ask you to not gather near the lab after 
you receive your payment. 
Are there any questions? 
 
(Random Treatment) 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk.  If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
Show up Fee 
Every participant will get $5 as a show up fee, and in addition you may earn money in 
the experiment. All the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
Anonymity  
You will be divided randomly into two groups, called Group 1 and Group 2. Each 
person in Group 1 will be anonymously paired with a person in Group 2. No one will 
learn the identity of the person he/she is paired with. 
Structure of the experiment 
This experiment is computerised, meaning you will be entering your decisions on the 
computer in front of you.  If you have any trouble entering your decisions, please raise 
your hand to alert the experimenter who will assist you. 
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Tokens and Points 
The currency used in this experiment are Tokens.  As you make decisions with these 
Tokens, you and your paired person will earn points.  Every point that people earn in 
this experiment will be worth 60 cents.  For example, if you earn 8 points you will 
make $4.80 from the decision part of the experiment. 
The Group 1 Decision Task 
Each person in Group 1 will have two options: 
 To choose OUT and receive 10 Tokens, earning 10 points.  In this case the 
paired Group 2 person with whom he/she is paired makes no decision, and 
earns 0 points. 
 To choose IN. In that case the paired person in Group 2 will get to split 10 
Tokens between the pair. That is, the person in Group 2 will decide how 
many of the 10 Tokens, to pass to the person in Group 1, and how many to 
hold for themselves.  Tokens that are passed or held will earn different 
amounts of points, depending on which Situation occurs, which is explained 
in the Group 2 Decision Task.   
Group 1 persons will not be informed which Situation has occurred prior to making 
their decision. Group 1 persons enter their decision by selecting the relevant option on 
the screen, followed by clicking OK. 
The Group 2 Decision Task 
If the Group 1 person chooses IN, then 10 Tokens will be made available to split 
between the two paired persons. The split will be determined by the Group 2 person.  
Each Group 2 person will be asked to decide how many Tokens out of 10 to pass to 
the Group 1 person with whom he/she is paired, and how many Tokens to hold for 
themselves.  Each Group 2 person must distribute all 10 Tokens, that is, the number of 
Tokens they pass and the number of Tokens they hold must sum to 10.  
The software will generate a random number to determine which Situation will occur.  
There is a 50% chance of Situation A occurring, and a 50% chance of Situation B 
occurring. 
If Situation A occurs, then tokens will earn points in the following way: 
 Tokens that are passed will earn their paired Group 1 person 2 points per 
Token.   
 Tokens that are held (i.e. the remainder of the 10 tokens not passed) will earn 
the Group 2 person 3 points per Token.  
If Situation B occurs, then tokens will earn points in the following way: 
 Tokens that are passed will earn their paired Group 1 person 6 points per 
Token.   
 Tokens that are held (i.e. the remainder of the 10 tokens not passed) will earn 
the Group 2 person 3 points per Token.  
Group 2 persons will be informed which Situation has occurred, and then asked to 
enter their decisions in the relevant text boxes, followed by clicking OK.  Note that 
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this decision by the Group 2 person will only be relevant if the Group 1 person chose 
IN. 
Payment of Show up Fees and Experiment Earnings 
All participants are asked to sit patiently until the end of the experiment. Once 
everybody has made their decisions, you will be presented with a screen instructing 
you to wait.  Do not click OK until the experimenter asks you to do so. You will then 
answer a questionnaire, followed by a summary of your earnings, and finally another 
questionnaire.  Once this is complete, you will be asked one by one to enter the 
payment room at the back of the lab for the payment of your earnings. Because your 
decision is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings 
either during or after the experiment. We also ask you to not gather near the lab after 
you receive your payment. 
Are there any questions? 
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Appendix C – Generosity Perceptions Elicitation Instructions 
 
Instructions 
Welcome to the experiment.  Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not 
talk.  If you have a question, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach you 
and answer your question in private. 
Every participant will get $5 as a show up fee, and in addition you can earn additional money 
in the experiment depending on your decisions. All the money will be paid to you in cash at 
the end of the experiment. 
 
Structure:  
There are two parts to this experiment.  In both parts you will be considering subjects who 
have participated in previous experiments, and asked to guess their responses to certain 
questions.  You will be given the instructions that those subjects received, but you will not 
be participating directly in the situation those instructions describe. The subjects who 
participated in the previous experiments were undergraduate students recruited for an 
economic experiment in a similar way that you have been recruited for this session today. 
 
Part 1: 
Please refer to the instructions contained in the envelope marked ‘1’.  These are the 
instructions that subjects received, but with 𝑿 in the place of the actual dollar amounts. Two 
different experiments were run, where either 𝑿 = −𝟐, or 𝑿 = 𝟒.  A subject in the 𝑋 = −2 
experiment did not know that 𝑋 was 4 in another experiment (and vice versa), or even that 
𝑋 was to be changed in another experiment.   
Subjects in one experiment did not participate in the other experiment, or in any of the 
other experiments described in Part 2. 
Please read the instructions from envelope 1 now.  We ask you to answer some 
comprehension questions to ensure your understanding of the situation the instructions 
describe.  For every one of these questions you answer correctly, you will receive an 
additional $0.50. 
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Part 1 (continued): 
Subjects made their decisions as described in the instructions, but did not observe the outcome. 
In other words, Group 1 people did not see their paired Group 2 person’s split, and Group 2 
people did not see whether their paired Group 1 person chose IN or OUT.  After all subjects had 
made their decisions, the following announcement was verbally made: 
“The decision part of the experiment is over.  We now ask you to answer a couple of 
questionnaires for which we will pay you an additional $5. Please answer the questions as 
accurately as possible. You will be asked some questions about the decisions you just made, then 
a summary of your earnings will appear.” 
The first question they were asked was presented in the following way: 
 
We ask you to guess what you think the average response by Group 2 people to this question 
was.   
The average is calculated by adding up each value for each subject (which takes the value 1 if 
they filled in the leftmost circle, 2 if they filled in the second circle, 3 if they filled in the center 
circle, 4 if they filled in the fourth circle, and 5 if they filled in the rightmost circle), and then 
dividing by the total number of subjects.  For example, if there were 3 subjects, and they 
selected values corresponding to 2, 1 and 5, then the value you would be trying to guess would 
be: 
2+1+5
3
= 2.67 (2 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑠). 
You may enter any number between 1.00 and 5.00, up to two decimal places.  You will be 
rewarded for the accuracy of your guess of the average response of the subjects who had 
previously participated in this experiment.  Your guess will be rewarded in the following way: 
𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 = 20 − 15 × (𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)2 
You cannot earn a negative payoff; if the above formula returns a negative number your payoff 
for that guess will be zero. For your convenience, a non-exhaustive table of payoffs is given in 
Table A as a function of how accurate your guess is, as well as Graph A, which graphically 
illustrates the above function.  
It is important that you understand how your payoff depends on errors.  
Note, the closer your guess is to the average response of the Group 2 subjects to the above 
question, the higher payoff you will receive for your guess.  An exact guess will earn you $20, 
but any errors will reduce your payoff, and larger errors will reduce your payoff by increasingly 
larger amounts.  If your error is very large, then your payoff for that guess will be zero.  
We ask you to consider the responses of Group 2 subjects in the 𝑿 = −𝟐 experiment 
separately from those in the 𝑿 = 𝟒 experiment, so you have 2 guesses to make for this part.  
Remember, that subjects in one experiment did not know about the other experiment, and only 
saw the instructions with either 𝑋 = −2 or 𝑋 = 4, not both. 
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In today’s session, we ask you to make 5 guesses in total between Part 1 (2 guesses) and Part 2 (3 
guesses).  However, for your final payoff, we will randomly select only one of your 5 guesses to 
add to your payoff for the guessing tasks. Therefore do your best and make each guess carefully 
as any of them could determine your payoff. 
 
Part 2: 
Please refer to the instructions in the envelope marked ‘2’.  These are the instructions that 
the previous subjects received, with changes which will be described in the following 
sentences.  Three experiments were run, which had different instructions relating to the 
yellow and green highlighted text present in your copy of the instructions.  The non-
highlighted text was the same across all experiments.  Two of the experiments had only the 
yellow highlighted text, and not the green highlighted text, with either 𝒀 = 𝟐 or 𝒀 = 𝟔. The 
third experiment had only the green highlighted text, and not the yellow highlighted text.  
We will refer to these three experiments as Yellow Y=2, Yellow Y=6, and Green respectively.  
Subjects in the Yellow experiments did not know that 𝑌 changed between the Yellow 
experiments, nor were they aware of the Green experiment. Similarly, subjects in the Green 
experiment were not aware of either of the Yellow experiments. 
Subjects only participated in one experiment, and did not participate in any of the 
experiments described in Part 1.  
Please read the instructions from envelope 2 now.  We ask you to answer some 
comprehension questions to ensure your understanding of the situation the instructions 
describe.  For every one of these questions you answer correctly, you will receive an 
additional $0.50. 
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Part 2 (continued): 
Subjects made their decisions as described in the instructions, but did not observe the outcome. 
In other words, Group 1 people did not see their paired Group 2 person’s split, and Group 2 
people did not see whether their paired Group 1 person chose IN or OUT.  After all subjects had 
made their decisions, the following announcement was verbally made: 
“The decision part of the experiment is over.  We now ask you to answer a couple of 
questionnaires for which we will pay you an additional $5. Please answer the questions as 
accurately as possible. You will be asked some questions about the decisions you just made, then 
a summary of your earnings will appear.” 
The first question they were asked was presented in the following way: 
 
We ask you to guess what you think the average response by Group 2 people to this question 
was.   
The average is calculated by adding up each value for each subject (which takes the value 1 if 
they filled in the leftmost circle, 2 if they filled in the second circle, 3 if they filled in the center 
circle, 4 if they filled in the fourth circle, and 5 if they filled in the rightmost circle), and then 
dividing by the total number of subjects.  For example, if there were 3 subjects, and they 
selected values corresponding to 2, 1 and 5, then the value you would be trying to guess would 
be: 
2+1+5
3
= 2.67 (2 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑠). 
You may enter any number between 1.00 and 5.00, up to two decimal places.  You will be 
rewarded for the accuracy of your guess of the average response of the subjects who had 
previously participated in this experiment.  Your guess will be rewarded in the following way: 
𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 = 20 − 15 × (𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)2 
You cannot earn a negative payoff; if the above formula returns a negative number your payoff 
for that guess will be zero. For your convenience, a non-exhaustive table of payoffs is given in 
Table A as a function of how accurate your guess is as well as Graph A, which graphically 
illustrates the above function. 
It is important that you understand how your payoff depends on errors.  
Note, the closer your guess is to the average response of the Group 2 subjects to the above 
question, the higher payoff you will receive for your guess.  An exact guess will earn you $20, 
but any errors will reduce your payoff, and larger errors will reduce your payoff by increasingly 
larger amounts.  If your error is very large, then your payoff for that guess will be zero.  
We ask you to consider the responses of Group 2 subjects in the Yellow Y=2 experiment 
separately from the Yellow Y=6 experiment and the Green experiment, so you have 3 guesses 
to make for this part. Remember, that subjects in one experiment did not know about the other 
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experiments, and only saw one set of the instructions (either the Yellow Y=2, Yellow Y=6 or 
Green). 
In today’s session, we ask you to make 5 guesses in total between Part 1 (2 guesses) and Part 2 (3 
guesses).  However, for your final payoff, we will randomly select only one of your 5 guesses to 
add to your payoff for the guessing tasks. Therefore, do your best and make each guess carefully 
as any of them might determine your payoff. 
 
Supplementary Material 
 
Table A: 
Error 0 .1 .2 .5 .75 .95 1 1.2 2 
Payoff 20.00 19.85 19.4 16.25 11.56 6.46 5.00 0 0 
 
 
 
 
Graph A: 
 
 
 
